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Abstract _ 
This paper examines the structure of the adjustment costs for heterogeneous labour inputs, 
allowing for asyrnmetries and for interaction effects in adjustment costs. To do this, an 
intertemporal model underlying firm's employment decisions is postulated, and the resulting Euler 
equations for the demands of permanent nonproduction (white collar) and production (blue collar) 
employees are estimated using a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms. The main results confirm 
the heterogeneity of adjustment costs for permanent employees, and the existence of significant 
cross-adjustment effects. This latter result implies that marginal adjustment costs from firing 
permanent production employees can be reduced if temporary workers are hired at the same time. 
However, there is not significant evidence of asyrnmetric adjustment costs in permanent labour 
inputs. 
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1. Introduction 
Public regulations aimed at enhancingjob-security are outstanding in most ofWestem European 
countries, and Spain is not an exception to this rule. These regulations seek to reduce the 
dismissal ofworkers and fluctuations in employment, and they are mainly effective by changing 
the costs of adjustment. To understand how these job-security regulations operate it is therefore 
necessary to explain how these costs affect labour demand and to infer how such regulations 
modify them. As stressed by Hamermesh and Pfann (1995), knowledge of the structure of 
adjustment costs is crucial to understand macroeconomic fluctuations in employment. 
Most empirical studies [e.g., Nadiri and Rosen (1969), Sargent (1978)] presume that the 
quasiftxity of labour results from increasing costs of adjustment. Nevertheless, the sources of 
such costs can be ve!)' different depending on whether changes in a frrm's employment are 
either positive (hiring costs) or negative (frring costs). Given the different sources ofhiring and 
frring costs, the adjustment costs will in general depend on the sign of the adjustment. In fact, 
although adjustment costs have been typically assumed to be symmetric, they yield an 
unsatisfacto!)' description ofthe costs that frrms face when adjusting employment. Empirically, 
the dynamics of labour demand based on symmetric (quadratic) adjustment costs are in general 
at variance with the data. This rejection is stronger as the level of disaggregation rises (e.g., 
from sectoral to frrm data). Using data on Dutch manufacturing frrms, Pfann and Verspagen 
(1989) obtain evidence in favour of asymmetric adjustment costs, in which hiring costs exceed 
frring costs. 
Moreover, the assumption of worker homogeneity can be inappropriate if there are 
differences in the dynamics of employment among labour inputs, and lead to wrong inferences. 
Intuitive1y, one would expect that adjustment costs will be higher the higher the skill of 
1 
.- -... ----.~--,-----r----..,_-------- ..~--.--------------
workers: training costs wiIl be lower for unskilled labour, srnce the fmn's expenditure on 
training wil1 be very small. Furthermore, since severance pay depends on the worker's earnings, 
wbich, other things equal, will depend on bis occupational level, frring costs will be higher the 
bigher the occupational level. Empirical fmdings by Palm and Pfann (1990 and 1993), using 
aggregate data from the Netherlands and the UK, and Bresson el al. (1991) using fmn-Ievel data 
from France, among others, show that the adjustment speed of unskil1ed workers is general1y 
bigher than that of skil1ed workers. Consequently, when fmns face a shock, they do not 
necessarily adjust employment uniformIy for the different labour inputs. 
Recognising labour heterogeneity requires examining how the costs ofchanging one type 
of labour affect the dynamics of demand for other types of labour. The lag in adjusting a 
particular type of labour should be greater than adjustment lags for other labour inputs if either 
its variable adjustment costs are more convex or they are simply greater and fmns do not know 
the duration ofthe shock. Additionally, the shock needed to adjust employment wil1 be greater 
the greater are the fIXed costs of adjustment for that type of labour. More general1y, stickiness 
in adjusting one type of labour will spill over into adjustment for other types of labour. 
The main purpose ofthis paper is to evaluate the structure ofadjustment costs for labour 
considering three different labour inputs, al10wing for interrelated dynamics among labour 
inputs,1 and for costs asyrnmetries associated with the hiring and frring ofworkers. To do this, 
1 use a Spanish panel data set of manufacturing fmns corresponding to the perlod 1986-1991. 
This data set contains annual information for every fmn on the number of employees by 
duration of the labour contract (fixed-term vs. indefmite) and by job (nonproduction or wbite 
Ipindyck and Rotemberg (1983) estímate a system of factor demands using US aggregate 
manufacturing data, but they assume that the effects ofchanges in one factor on costs ofadjusting other 
factors are zero, so cross effects in their model appear sole1y through technology. 
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collar workers vs. production or blue collar workers). We derive and estimate Euler equations 
for demands of produetion and nonproduction employees in a standard profit-maximising 
framework, using an asymmetric adjustment costs representation. 
The case of Spain is specially appealing for two reasons. Firstly, regulations underIying 
Spanish labour market lie on the same job-security principIes as most of Westem European 
countries [see Burda (1991)]. Most ofthese countries have been charaeterised by the existence 
of mandatory severance payments, which increase frring costs leading in practice to (quasi) 
permanent labour contracts. These higher costs reduce fluctuations in employment at the expense 
of greater lags in employment adjustment, which generates persistence in employment. In 
addition, as Blanchard el al. (1995) remark, the microeconomic aspeets of the Spanish labour 
market, and in particular its labour market institutions and regulations, "make the Spanish 
market one of the most rigid in the industrialized worId". Before 1984, the labour market 
legislation only al10wed for permanent employment contracts, which entailed restricted 
conditions for layoffs, with sizeable redundancy payments. Since 1984, restrictions on fixed-term 
or temporary contracts were gradually eliminated. New labour regulations allowed fmns to offer 
workers temporary contracts for jobs that were not temporary in nature,2 and to dismiss workers 
with temporary contracts with low redundancy payments (relative to those for permanent 
workers, that is, workers with indefmite contracts). These reforms entailed a significant increase 
in the share of temporary employees in total employment3 whereas strong regulations on 
2Prior to 1984, fIXed-tenn contracts were allowed just for seasonal jobs, related to agriculture, 
construction and tourism activities. 
3After 1986 there started a huge increase in the number of temporary contracts. The share of 
temporary employment in Spain rose from 10% in the whole economy and 2% in manufacturing in 1983 
to 33% in the whole economyand 10% in manufacturing in 1993. Between 1986 and 1990, 80% ofthe 
contracts registered at employment offices were temporary. For a complete description ofthe typology 
of temporary contracts in Spain and their effects, see Segura el al. (1991). 
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permanent emptoyment were maintained. In prevIous work, Sanz Gómez (1994) found that 
permanent production workers have been strongly substituted by temporary workers. The 
extensive use of temporary contracts in Spain since the mid-SOs, and the fact that the maximum 
duration of a temporary contract was set at three years, has shaped a dualistic labour market, 
where labour turnover is high for temporary workers, but very low for permanent ones. The 
Spanish dataset used in this paper allows us to consider differences in adjustment costs and 
cross-adjustment effects for three different labour inputs: permanent nonproduction workers, 
permanent production workers and temporary workers. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The basic mode! that we are interested in 
is presented in section 2. Section 3 summarises the characteristics of the data set and of the 
sample period for which data is available, and discusses the econometric approach. The 
estimation results are presented in section 4. Section 5 gathers the main implications of the 
empirical analysis and concludes. 
2. A dynamic model of labour inputs demands 
The frrm is assumed to maximise the expected discounted value ofthe stream ofcurrent 
and future real profits. Every period, it chooses inputs of permanent nonproduction or white 
collar workers (L!), permanent production or blue collar workers CL2), and temporary workers 
CLJ), and uses capital (assumed to be predetermined).4 Therefore, the problem to the frrm can 
be written as: 
~s simplifying asslUTIption, which is equivalent to asslUTIe that adjustment costs for capital are not 
interrelated with labour inputs, might be relaxed introducing cross-adjustment terrns for capital in the 
adjustment costs ftmction. We rule out this possibility in order to minimise the nlUTIber of parameters 
to estimate. 
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(1) 
where B¡[.]=E[.I Q), with Q being the infonnation set available to the fmn when choosing 
labour inputs at time t; F(.) is the produetion fimction, which depends on the vector of labour 
inputs, L¡=(L¡I,L?,L?)', and the capital stock ~. The fimetion AC(.) represents external 
adjustment costs measured in output units. Finally, W¿ is the real wage paid to labour input j, 
W. The adjustment costs fimetion AC(.) is defmed in terms ofthe growth rates ofthe number 
ofworkers, that is, AC(L¡~,L¡~_I)=AC(~~). Whereas adjustment costs can be very important 
for perrnanent workers, they are assumed to be negligible for temporary workers. 
The frrst-order conditions (Euler equations) corresponding to this maximisation problem 
can be written as: 
(2) 
To get explicit forms for the Euler equations, it is necessary to take parameterisations of the 
technology and the adjustment costs fimction. For the technology, we take a parsimonious and 
homogeneous representation that allows for non-constant elasticities of substitution: 
y = A K cz II (Nj)~J (E Nj)~o (3)III I jI' 
j 
where N¿ denotes labour input j in annual units.5 Therefore, for each labour input, we have 
5That is, whereas for pennanent labour inputs 0=1,2), N/=L¿, for the temporary labour input N/ 
= 1..¡3 x(Average number ofweeks worked along the year)/52. 
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(4) 
Adjustment costs for pennanent labour inputs allows for asyrnmetries between frring and hiring 
costs, that is, the cost of a positive change is allowed to differ from the cost of a negative 
change of the same size. Furthennore, we allow for cross-adjustment effects amongst different 
labour inputs. In fact, although it is assumed that changes in temporary workers (43) do not 
entail adjustment costs, they may affect adjustment costs associated with pennanent workers. 
We assume that labour adjustment costs can be written in terms of the growth rates of labour 
inputs, and postulate two altemative empirical specifications. The frrst one is a third degree 
polynomial on the growth rates of labour inputs: 
2 2 
m m 
ACCL\InLt) = ~~ ymm (L\InLt )2 + ~]; 0m (L\InLt )3 , (S.a) 
1 2 1 3 2 3 
+ y12 (L\InLt )(L\InLt ) + y13 (L\InLt )(L\InLt ) + y23 (L\InLt )(L\InLt ) 
where asyrnmetry between hiring and frring costs arises whenever ~:tO: hiring costs will be 
higher (resp. lower) than frring costs if ~>O (resp. ~<O). The coefficients "(¡k capture possible 
interactions among adjustments in different labour inputs. Note that this specification allows for 
the marginal cost of adjusting one labour input to be reduced if another labour input is changed 
accordingly. For example, if "(¡,,>O (resp. "(¡k<O) and ~<O, adjustment costs will be reduced 
if ~k>o (resp. ~k>o). 
The parameters associated with the cubic terms in this specification, however, can entail 
identification problems if the variability in the growth rates of labour inputs is small. For this 
reason, we will also use an altemative quadratic specification, which differs from the 
conventional quadratic specification by the fact that, as in (S.a), interactions are introduced, and 
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coefficients associated with quadratic tenns are allowed to be different depending on the sign 
of adjustment: 
(5.b) 
where l4m equals one if~~, and zero otherwise. Differences between the coefficients YjjP and 
YjjN capture asymmetry between hiring and frring costs, so that ifY/>r/ (resp. y/q/) hiring 
costs are higher (resp. lower) than frring costs.6 
For each labour input, we will have: 
aAC(~lnLt) = ~ [aAC(~~t)], (6) 
aL j L J a~lnLJt t t 
and the Euler equation for the jth labour input can be written as: 
(7) 
Even though the Euler equations include unobserved expectations of forward variables, we can 
substitute them by their actual values and add an expectational error. Under rational 
expectations, and in the absence of measurement errors and macroeconomic shocks, this 
expectational error ~+lj satisfies the orthogonality condition E[~+lj IQ]=O. However, while 
6Whereas the rnain source of asymmetry for eachj-th input comes through either ~ in (5.a) or y} 
and Yl in (5.b), the coefficients Yik only have a marginal impact on the asymmetry between hiring and 
frring costs; their rnain effect is on the convexity curvature of the adjustment costs firnction. 
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expectations of forward variables will be a function of variables in the infonnation set Q (and 
thus orthogonal to the error tenn), actual values of variables dated t+1 will no longer be 
orthogonal to the error tenn. Therefore, OL8 estimates will be inconsistent and an instrumental 
variable approach will be needed in estimation, where in principIe any variable included in the 
infonnation set will be a valid instrumento 
Moreover, the system containing the Euler equations for both nonproduction and 
production workers incorporates cross-equation restrictions in technology and adjustment costs. 
We will perfonn joint estimation of the system using the Generalised Method of Moments. 
3. The data and econometric issues 
The main data set is a balanced panel of 1,080 manufacturing fmns recorded in the 
database of the Central de Balances del Banco de España (Central Balance Sheet Office, after 
this, CBBE) during the period 1986-1991. Although this database contains infonnation on the 
balance sheets and other complementary infonnation for a large number of manufacturing 
companies since 1982, dissaggregated data on employment is reported only since 1986. We have 
thus selected all those fmns who remained in the sample along the whole period 1986-1991, and 
satisfied several coherency conditions, which are described in the Data Appendix. Data on three 
categories of employment are available: pennanent employees, which are broken down by 
occupation into nonproduction or white collar workers and production or blue collar employeeS, 
and temporary employees. Unfortunately, no breakdown by occupation exists for temporary 
employees. Finally, another limitation ofthe data is that there is no data available on frrings and 
hirings, so we can only measure net changes through the change in the stock of labour inputs 
8 
but we cannot measure gross changes in labour inputs.7 Consequently, all the dynamics that can 
be captured when estimating the mode1 will be based on net changes in employment. The 
distribution of fmns by size and by industIy is reported in Table 1. 
Even though the CBBE data includes information on the fmn's average wage rate for 
its labour force (fmn's labour costs/number of employees), the fmn's wage rate for each labour 
input is not reported. Complementary data on wages is obtained from the Encuesta de Salarios 
(Wage Swvey, source: National Statistics; ES after this) and from Distribución Salarial en 
España (Wage Distribution in Spain, source: National Statistics, DS after this). The ES survey 
provides industIy-Ievel information about average wages for production and nonproduction 
employees per year, irrespective of contract duration. In order to distinguish the wage rates 
between temporary and permanent employees, we use the DS survey. Unfortunately, the DS 
survey reports this information at industIy level just for 1988, so we will not be able to capture 
any time variation of relative wages between temporary and permanent employees. 
Since we only observe the wage rate for each labour input by industIy, we will assume 
that the wage rate for each labour input relative to the remaining labour inputs is the same for 
fmns in the same industry. Let W¡j, W/ be the average wage rates of the ith fmn in perlod t 
for the labour inputs j,k G,k=1,2,3) respectively. We can relate these two wage rates in the form: 
j _ j.k k (8)Wit - lJ.it W it ' 
where Jlik is the margin of the wage rate for labour input j over the wage rate for labour input 
k. Given that at the fmn level we only observe the total wage bill and the number of the three 
types of workers, to achieve identification we will assume that the margins Jl¡j.k are equal for 
7We believe that this problem is more acute the higher the leve! of aggregation in employrnent, so 
hopefully disaggregation ofemployees by occupation and by type ofcontract will reduce the difference 
between net and gross changes. 
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fmns in the same índustry. We will calculate these margins from infonnation on the average 
wage rates per labour types contained in the ES and the DS surveys.8 
The assumptions needed to construct the wage rates for different labour inputs imply that 
if a fmn pays a wage rate aboye the industry wage rate to certain type ofworker, it pays wages 
aboye the industry wage rate to aH types of workers. This is partly consistent with Krueger and 
Surnmers (1988) for the US and, particularly, with Andrés and García (1991), for Spain, where 
fmns that pay wages aboye the average in sorne categoI)' tend to pay wages aboye the average 
in aH categories. 
Value added in Spanish manufacturing registered an annual average growth rate of 3.9% 
during the period 1986-1990. Employment in manufacturing grew accordingly at an average 
annual rate of2.7%. In the fonner expansive period (1966-1974), an annual growth rate of9.1% 
in manufacturing value added led to a 3.4% employrnent growth.9 This greater elasticity of 
employment to GDP growth in the eighties is partly explained by the greater flexibility of the 
Spanish labour market. As Bentolila and Dolado (1994) stressed, the introduction oftemporary 
contracts has contributed to reduce the persistence in the leve! of employment. The share of 
temporary employrnent in Spanish manufacturing has risen monotonicaHy along the period 
1986-1990. Table 2 shows the evolution over time ofthe main variables related to fmns' activity 
for our sample. The most striking fact from Table 2 is that the evolution of different labour 
types has been very dissimilar, which confmns that assuming homogeneous labour would hide 
differences in employment dynamics for the different labour inputs. Whereas the number and 
80bviously, whereas the wage margin of labaur input j relative to labaur input k will be constant 
across fmns in the same industry, the wage margin of a given labaur input with respect to the average 
wage rate (totallabaur costltotal employrnent) will in general be different across fmns, reflecting the 
different occupational structure of employrnent across fmns. 
91bis discussion abaut employrnent refers to employees and excludes self-employed workers. 
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the share in total employment of pennanent employees decreases along the period, temporary 
employment experienced a sharp growth from 1987 to 1990.10 Such period corresponds to the 
booming years, with high growth rates in real output, which contrasts with the evolution of 
permanent employment along the same years. The reduction in pennanent employment is main1y 
due to a large reduction in pennanent production employment: its share in total employment 
falls monotonically from 62.3 per cent in 1986 to 55.8 per cent in 1991. 
Tables 3 and 4 report, for each labour input, the sample frequencies from 1987 to 1991 
of movements by year and by size, respectively. Examining these tables,the following 
conclusions can be drawn. First, while the proportion of observations not adjusting temporary 
employment is very small, we found a significant proportion of finns not adjusting pennanent 
employment. Moreover, adjustments are much more infrequent for nonproduction workers. This 
keeps consistency with higher levels of fmn-specific human capital investment for this type of 
workers. Second, for any labour input, the largerthe fmn iS,the higher the probability of 
adjustment. This evidence can be due either to the existence of fixed costs of adjustment or to 
the existence of indivisibilities in labour inputs, which are more important the lower the frrm's 
size. 1I 
The fmding that many fmns do not adjust employment every year is inconsistent with 
a differentiable specification for adjustment costs, because there should not be any mass point 
for &1L¡¿. If observations with &1L¡¿=O are due to indivisibilities, the Euler equations would 
still be valid for observations for which adjustment is done. In such a case, the Euler equations 
lD:Even though the emplo)TIlent trend for our sample matches that for total manufacturing unti11991, 
the growth rates for our sample are significant1y lower than the rate for total manufacturing emplo)TIlent 
in this periodo 
IIIn the basis of informal evidence, it appears that smaller frrms malee fewer adjustments in the 
number of employees but in turn they exploit more frequently the possibility of overtime hours. 
Unfortunately, we only have data on number of employees, but not on hours effectively worked. 
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can be estimateáusing observations for which· adjustment in both permanent labour inputs in 
two consecutive periods is done. Since sample selection depends on the variable of interest, 
endogeneity of se1ection must be accounted foro For the fulI sample, the error term in the Euler 
equation satisfies 1;[E¡,t+lj ]=E[E¡,t+lj IQJ=O, where Qt is the information set at period 1. Let 
Dit=I(&¡tl&¡t2:;t()), where IO is the indicator function, and &¡tl and &it2, are the changes in 
permanent nonproduction and production labour, respectively: for estimation, we wilI use those 
observations satisfying D¡,t+IDit=1. We can write the probability of D¡,t+IDit=1 as 
Pr[n'Z¡,t+I+t>.,t+I>O]' where Z¡t consists on variables inc1uded in the information set at period 1. 
Thus, for equation j we will have that 1;[E¡,t+lj ID¡,t+IDit=1]=a¡+lj \t+I:;t(), where Oi+lj is the 
covariance between E¡ t+lj and t>. t+1 (normalised by the variance of t>. t+I), and ~ t+1 is a function 
, , " 
of the Z's which, if t>.,t+1 is normally distributed, is the inverse of the MilIs' ratio [see Amemiya 
(1984)]. The error term has no longer zero mean, yet it is possible to reformulate the model in 
(9) 
Euler equations will be estimated as a joint system by the Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM). The Euler equation for labour input j can be written as 
(lO) 
both permanent labour inputs can be written as 
(11) 
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Substituting the expected values of variables dated t+l, we can write the Euler equations in 
tenns of observables as 
(12) 
where U¡,t+I=[U¡,t+l l ,U¡,t+12]' denotes the vector of expectational errors in both Euler equations, 
such that E[U¡,t+l IQJ = E[€¡,t+l-q+l~,t+lIQt,D¡,t+lD¡t=l]=O, with q+l = [q+ll,q+12]'. The error 
tenn wiIl be orthogonal to aIl variables included in the conditioning set at t, but not to variables 
dated t+l; instrumental variable estimation is thus needed. Every Zt:itá4t wiIl be a valid 
instrument, for it will fulfil the orthogonality condition E[€¡,t+lZt:iJ=O. Such orthogonality 
conditions between the error term and the instruments yield a vector of moment restrictions for 
every fmn i, which we denote as 'Vi(x¡,8)=['Vil',\Vi2""',\ViTT, where \Vi8)=h(X¡t,x¡,t+¡,8)Z¡t and 
Z¡t=[Zlt,~t, ...,ZKt]. GMM procedures exploit the sample analogues of such moment restrictions, 
where 80MM is the estimator that minimises the quadratic fonn: 
L l\J¡ex¡,8)/ ANL l\J¡ex¡,8) (13) 
¡ ¡ 
where ~ is a weighting matrix. Under some regularity conditions, the GMM estimator 80MM 
is consistent for arbitrary choices of the weighting matrix~. Nevertheless, ~ can be chosen 
optimally to obtain an (asymptotically) efficient GMrvf estimator. This optimal choice of ~ is 
1given by VN- , where VN is a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix of the moment 
restrictions. 12 The cross-equation restrictions in the system of Euler equations induce non­
12The asymptotically optimal weighting matrix is VI, where V=E[\Vi(x¡,8)\Vi(x¡,8)']. A consistent 
estimate of V is its sample analogue, based on a consistent estimate of 8, that is, 
V= ~L¡ ['P¡(x¡,e) 'P¡(Xi'e)'] . Usual1y, a consistent frrst step estimate is obtained by setting ~ to sorne 
13 
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linearities, so that e-must be obtained by numeñcal optimisatíon, see Ogaki (1993). Estimation 
was performed using a program written in GAUSS language and the optimisation algorithm of 
Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb and Shanno included in the GAUSS application module OP1MUM. 
We wiIl compute two-step GMM estimates, that take the weighting matrix WJ8) based on the 
one-step GMM estimates (that in turn use the identity matrix as the weighting matrix). The fact 
that ~t is replaced by a sample estimate in the econometric specification implies that the 
conventional standard errors wiIl be, strictly speaking, inconsistent. However, obtaining 
consistent standard errors in this framework is a nontrivial task that is beyond the scope of this 
paper, and therefore we will not consider this problem. 
4. Estimation results 
We estimate the model for both permanent labour inputs, nonproduction and production 
workers, but we did not estimate the Euler equation for temporary employees; this input enters 
contemporaneously the Euler equations for permanent employment and is treated as endogenous. 
Given that estimation is done for observations for which adjustments occur in both types of 
permanent labour in the current and the previous period, it is necessary to control for the 
endogeneity ofselection. As discussed in the former section, under endogenous sample selection 
the error term will no longer have zero mean, that is E¡[E¡,t+1j ID¡,t+1Dit=1]=a¡+lj\t+1' We will thus 
estimate a Probit model for the probability that non-zero adjustments in both permanent labour 
inputs occur, and calculate \t+1 as the inverse of the Mill's ratio, see Amemiya (1984). Of 
course, to ensure that the inclusion of ~i.t+l does not introduce endogeneity, Probit estimation 
knO\vn value, and then AN is obtained by setting AN = V-1 for the two step estimate. See Arellano 
and Bond (1991) or ügaki (1993). 
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is carried out yem- by yem-, using variables that are valid instruments in the Euler equations. In 
addition, given that generalised heteroscedasticity is allowed, the coefficients on J.i,t+l are 
allowed to be time-varying. Estimates ofthe reduced-form Probit equations from 1988 to 1991 
are reported in Table 5. 
As described above, the wage measure for the labour input jth in the fmn i is computed 
using fmn-Ievel information on the average wage and industry-Ievel information on relative 
wages for nonproduction and production employees. Therefore, the wage measure Wi~ is 
expected to be measured with error, differing from the true wage wf by a multiplicative error 
termo It seems plausible to assume that such error term will contain a highly persistent 
component. For instance, for a fmn paying an actual relative wage for the jth labour input that 
is higher than the corresponding industry-Ievel relative wage, the measured relative wage (based 
on industry-Ievel information). will be lower than the true relative wage, so that there is a 
downward measurement error. In such a case, the relative wage for the jth labour input in such 
fmn will be more likely to remain above the industry-Ievel relative wage in subsequent periods, 
so that presumably there will be a downward measurement error in the subsequent periods. 
Therefore, we postulate the following relationship between the naturallogarithm of the true real 
wage and the natural logarithm of the observed real wage: 
j - j * j rj (14)
<..lit - <..lit + Tli + \oit 
where the structure ofthe measurement error in wages is characterised by a time-invariant, fmn­
specific, measurement error component, and an additional uncorrelated component (;) reflecting 
further differences between the measured logarithm of the wage and the logarithm of the true 
15 
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wage. Notice that sorne assumption about the measurement error structure, like the one we make 
for the logarithm of wages, is necessary for model identification. 
The model is estimated in frrst-differences to account for this source (and other possible 
sources) of fmn-specific fixed effects. To control for aggregate shocks affecting al1 fmns 
equal1y, we include time durnmies in both Euler equations, and al10w the coefficients on the 
time durnmies to differ across labour inputs. Final1y, we control for the degree of utilisation of 
production factors using 2-digit industry-Ievel data on capacity utilisation. We compute the 
fmns' real discount rate using a measure of the long term nominal interest rate deflated by the 
corresponding industry-Ievel price indices. See the Data Appendix for a complete description 
of the variables. 
Under measurement errors in wages, and even assuming that these measurement errors 
are serial1y uncorrelated, only the values ofpredetermined values dated t-2 and earlier are valid 
instruments.The instrument set for the Euler equation for input j contains values of changes in 
the three labour inputs lagged two and three periods, lagged values ofaverage real productivities 
of labour inputs, and the real wage for input j lagged two periods. These variables are arranged 
to enter as they do in the levels specification ofthe Euler equation, which significantly improves 
the precision of the estimates. For the adjustment costs representation (5.b), it was found 
important the inclusion in the instrument set ofdummy variables describingwhether adjustments 
in labour inputs were positive or negative interacted with changes in their corresponding labour 
inputs. 
One important issue is that although the parameters of the set of Euler equations are 
theoretical1y identified, yet it is necessary to account for sufficient variability in the data to 
capture the effects of positive and negative adjustments in labour inputs. Table 6 suggests that 
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there exist sufficient frequencies of cross adjustments of different signs among the different 
labour inputs to guarantee this. 
Two-step estimates of the set of Euler equations given by (7) and the adjustment costs 
parameterisation (S.a) are reported in the frrst column of Table 7. Parameters associated with 
quadratic terms are positive for both nonproduction workers (YII) and production workers (Y22)' 
We also fmd positive and significant coefficients for the cross-adjustment tenn between 
permanent nonproduction and pennanent production workers (YI2) as well as for the cross­
adjustment effect between production workers and temporary workers (YI3)' The implication is 
that the marginal costs of frring permanent production employees, for example, can be reduced 
ifeither pennanent nonproduction or temporary workers are hired at the same time. Even though 
the sign ofthe asymmetry coefficients qis negative (suggesting that frring costs exceed hiring 
costs), they are clearly non-significant, which can be due to the high correlation between the 
quadratic and the cubic terms, making parameter estimates imprecise. 
This sort of evidence is also found for the Euler equations corresponding to the 
adjustment costs specification (S.b), whose estimates are reported in the last column of Table 
7. The parameters associated with the quadratic tenn when hiring occurs are positive for 
nonproduction and production employees (YIIP and Y22~' although non significant. Furthennore, 
hiring costs are higher for nonproduction employees, what is consistent with the need of frrm­
specific human capital investment the higher the occupational level of the worker. The 
coefficients for the quadratic tenn when frring is done are also positive for both types of 
pennanent labour, whichwould ensure convexity ofthe adjustment costs function in the absence 
of interactions. Even though for both labour inputs, Y/ is higher than yl, which would imply 
that frring costs are higher than frring costs, the low significance of the coefficients does not 
17 
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yield strong evidence on this. From the J test, we can see that the probability aboye which the 
overidentifying restrictions would be rejected is about ten percent for both specifications. 13 
Interestingly, values of the cross-adjustments coefficients Yik imply the previous 
qualitative results, implying that when reducing labour input of type j, significant reductions in 
marginal adjustment costs are possible if the amount of another labour input is increased. 
Considering the two alternative specifications, we only found significant differences in the value 
of the cross adjustment effect between permanent labour inputs (YI2)' Our results thus show that 
interrelations among labour inputs are important for the dynamics of demand of labour inputs, 
for they are affected by changes in the costs of other inputs. Since coefficients for cross­
adjustments terms are positive, ifemployees ofa given type are frred, the incurred marginal cost 
is reduced if workers of a different type are hired at the same time. In our context, it is clear 
that the generalisation of temporary contracts has contributed to lessen the cost of dismissing 
permanent employees (especial1y, produetion employees). One striking result concerns the high 
value OfYI2 with respect to the remaining interaction terms, which is partly surprising given the 
heterogeneity between production and nonproduction employees. This coefficient can be 
possibly capturing, in addition to cross-adjustment effects, the effect of a change towards 
technologies ofproduction less intensive in production workers. The increase both in net fixed­
capital investment and in the share ofpermanent nonproduction employment, as shown in Table 
2, favours this explanation. 
The least satisfactory results concern the technology coefficients, whose values entail 
implausibly low marginal productivities for both permanent labour inputs. There are two 
possible explanations to this problem. The frrst one is that the correlation between the variables 
13Although the J test is usually used to test the validity of the instrwnent set, it is a general 
specification test, that gives evidence on the validity of the mode1. However, rejection of the 
overidentifying restrictions says nothing about the source of model misspecification. 
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associated with marginal adjustment costs and the average productivities of labour inputs is 
high. However, this problem is not very acute in our case, because the different functional fonns 
for marginal adjustment costs and technology ensures that the sample correlation between such 
variables is not too high. The second one is that the perfect competition assumption is 
inappropriate and the technological coefficients are downward biased: under a simple model of 
imperfect competition, e.g., monopolistic competition, the ~ coefficients would capture W(1-E), 
where Wand Eare the true technological coefficient and the frrm's elasticity of demand for 
output, respectively. However, lack of data on output prices at the individual frrm level would 
make difficult to identify E. This problem was also apparent with a Cobb-Douglas technology. 
Altemative specifications for technology (translogarithmic and quadratic, among others) and the 
introduction of sorne fonns of imperfect competition were tried. Nevertheless, these altemative 
specifications introduced additional parameters and additional cross-equation restrictions, 
worsening the convergence of the algorithm and the precision of the estimates. 
As Bresson el al. (1991) stress, one must not believe that estirnates of the Euler 
equations give the global adjustment costs function. Such estimates, which are very dependent 
on the sample behaviour of employrnent, give only an indication of the local shape of this 
function. In particular, as Table 2 shows, the sample period (1987-1991) is characterised by a 
huge increase in the number of temporary employees together with a faH in permanent 
production employees. 
To end up, evidence on asymmetry through quadratic tenns is not conclusive. In fact, 
when testing symmetry (~=O, j=1,2) in specification (5.a), the value of the statistic 
(asymptoticaHy distributed as a X\) is 0.44, so the symmetric specification cannot be rejected. 
What seems to be clear is that adjustment costs differ for both types ofpermanent workers, and 
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that eross adjustment tenns (especially those linked to produetion employees) are c1early 
significant. 
5. Conc1usions 
In this paper we have derived and estimated interre1ated Euler equations for demand of 
pennanent labour inputs, name1y production and nonproduetion workers, in a dynamic 
optimisation framework under rational expectations. To do this, the capital stock was taken as 
predetermined and temporary labour was inc1uded as a separate labour input to consider 
interrelations with both types of pennanent labour. The specification we have used allows for 
asymmetries between hiring and frring costs and for cross-adjustments effects among different 
labour inputs. The altemative adjustment costs functions were fonnulated in tenns of re1ative 
changes in employment to take into account the re1ative sizes offmns. The econometric analysis 
was perfonned using a panel of 1080 Spanish manufacturing fmns. 
The main conc1usions that can be drawn from the estimations are as follows. First, there 
is evidence on heterogeneity in adjustment costs between permanent labour inputs. Second, 
eross-adjustment effects among different labour inputs are positive, thus implying that if the 
fmn reduces its level for a given labour input, costs ofadjustment can be reduced at the margin 
if the fmn inereases the leve1 of a different labour input at the same time. These eross­
adjustment effects are specially important for pennanent production workers. The interaction 
coefficient with pennanent nonproduction workers and temporary workers is positive and 
significant. From this result, in a context of a reduction in the number ofpennanent production 
employees, the induced costs of such reduction can be lowered if pennanent production labour 
is substituted by temporary labour. The interaction coefficient between temporary workers and 
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pennanent nonproduction workers, however, is small and non significant, which is consistent 
with the fact that temporary employment is hardly a close substitute of nonproduction 
employment. Therefore, reductions in adjustment costs induced by the massive introduction of 
temporary contracts have not been possibly so important as in the production workers case. 
Third, evidence on asymmetry between frring and hiring costs is not clear-cut: in fact, symmetry 
is not rejected by the data. Finally, adjustment costs for nonproduction workers appear to be 
higher than adjustment costs for production workers. Intuitively, this is a sensible result, because 
ofthe higher fmn-specific human capital associatedwith nonproduction or white collar workers. 
However, our results need to be qualified for a number of reasons. Mainly, most of the 
limitations of this study are intrinsically linked to the limitations of the data. First, as asserted 
by Hamermesh (1992 and 1993) and Hamermesh and Pfann (1995), employment plans are likely 
to be revised more frequently than once a year. Use of data at annual frequencies can lead to 
wrong inferences on the underlying structure of adjustment costs;14 empirically, quarterly data 
seem to be more adequate. In fact, the frequency at which demand for labour inputs is revised 
will be higher the higher the flexibility ofthe contracto Therefore, the incidence ofthis problem 
will be more acute in the case of temporary workers than in the case of permanent workers. 
Second, since there is no available data on hirings and frrings but only on the level of 
labour inputs, it is only possible to identify adjustment costs associated with net changes in the 
level of labour inputs. Certainly, costs associated with gross changes in labour inputs may be 
important even ifthere is no change in the level oflabour inputs. Another data limitation is that 
there is no information on hours worked, so it is implicitly assumed that employees and hours 
move together. The existence of flexibility in hours allows frrms to change hours when it is not 
14Hamennesh (1992) suggest that use of temporally aggregated data can only offer smooth 
approximations to the underlying structure of adjustment costs. 
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profitable to alter employrnent. This problem, pointed by Hamermesh (1993), does not seem so 
important in the case of European labour markets, were regulations on working hours are very 
rigid. 15 Particularly, in the case of Spain, dispersion in weekly working hours is not very high. 
Third, whereas the empirical analysis has taken capital stock as predetermined, it is 
plausible that the decisions of investment and labour demand were interrelated. In such a case, 
the adjustment costs function could be augmented to include cross-adjustments of labour and 
capital inputs. However, the generalisation towards a more realistic model should pay the price 
of a less parsimonious model and other potential misspecification problems related to 
assumptions on the timing of investment decisions and on the moment when newly hired capital 
becomes productive. 
Finally, we believe that the main limitation concerns the small number of cross sections 
available to estimate the model. This circumscribes the validity of the results, because 
estimations of the parameters may strongly depend on the aggregate phenomena that occurred 
in the sample periodo Only the availability of data for additional periods can clarifY this 
question. 
15In the United States, the dispersion ofhours worked is very high, so hours adjustment is effectively 
a mechanism that enhances employers' flexibility to adjust their production to market conditions. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
Constrnction 01 the data set 
The sample consists on a balanced panel of 1,080 non-energy manufacturing fmns, with a public 
share lower than 50 percent and with positive employment and labour costs, reported to the Bank of 
Spain's Central Balance Sheet Office from 1986 to 1991. To obtain this fInal sample, we applied 
sequentially the fol1owing fIlters: 
(1) Filters needed to construct the market value ofthe capital stock: 
(a) Book value of capital stock, total accumulated depreciation and annual depreciation of the 
capital stock must be positive. 
(b) The average life ofcapital must lie between percentiles 1st and 99th, and the average age of 
the capital stock must be lower than the 80% of its average life. 
(e) The absolute growth in the book value of the capital stock cannot be greater than 300%. 
(2) Filters related with the performance of the fmn: 
(a) Sales, gross output and totallabour costs must be positive. 
(b) Accounting equity must be positive. 
(c) The fmn cannot change from one industry to another. 
(d) Both permanent non-production employment and permanent production employment must 
be positive. 
Vcuiable constrnction 
Employment 
Number ofemployees is dissagregated inpennanent nonproduction,pennanentproduction and temporary 
employees. To maintain measurement consistency, number of temporary employees is calculated in 
annual terms by multiplying the number of temporary employees along the year times the average 
number of weeks worked by temporary employees and divided by 52. 
Real wages 
The measure ofthe fmn's annual average labour costs per employee Wit is computed as the ratio ofTotal 
wages and salaries to Total number of employees. This measure was deflated using Retail Price Indices 
for each of the subsectors of manufacturing industry. (Source: Spain's Institute of National Statistics, 
A-l 
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hereinafter INE). Computation ofaverage wages per type oÍworker is done using infonnation on wages 
of non-production and production employees at sectorallevel from Encuesta de Salarios and on wages 
of permanent and temporary employees at sectorallevel from Distribución de Salarios (Source: INE). 
The wage for temporary employees is computed as wril=WiLiIT+Lil")/(LiIT+L/~tl), where, for 
period t, L} L/ are the average annual number of temporary employees and the number of permanent 
employees in the fmn, respectively, and ~tT is the wage margin ofpermanent employees with respect 
to temporary employees (obtained at the sectoral level from Distribución de Salarios). The wage of 
permanent employees is thus W"il=~/:rwril' The wage for permanent production or blue collar employees 
Pwcan be computed as Wlb::(W"ilL¡I")/(I.,tb+LiIPw~/·1, where, for period t, Lr and Lil are the number
 
ofpermanent production (blue collar) employees and permanent nonproduction (white collar) employees,
 
respective1y, and ~ilb.w is the wage margin of nonproduction employees with respect to production
 
employees (obtained at the sectoral level from Encuesta de Salarios). Finally, the wage of permanent
 
white collar employees is computed as WiIPw=~it·"'W/b.
 
Output
 
Gross output at retail prices is calculated as total sales, plus the change in fmished product inventories
 
and other income from the production process, minus taxes derived on the production (net ofsubsidies).
 
Interest rates
 
To compute the discount rate, we use as long-term interest rate that on the e1ectricity company bonds.
 
(Source: Bank of Spain). The real rate of retum is computed deflating the nominal rate of retum by the
 
corresponding Retail Price Index at the 2-digit industry c1assification (Source: INE).
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Distribution oC finm by industIy and by size
 
Small Medium 1 Meaium ¿ Large lotal 
Absolute freq. 1 4 :3 2 10 
Iron, steel and metal (22) % in the industry 
% in size category 10.00 0.66 
40.00 
1.07 
30.00 
1.03 
20.00 
0.76 
100.00 
0.93 
Building materials, glass 
and ceramics (24) 
Absolute tteq. 
% in the industry 
% in size category 
12 
13.64 
7.89 
3K 
43.18 
10.16 
21 
23.86 
7.22 
17 
19.32 
6.46 
KK 
100.00 
8.15 
Absolutefreq. 15 42 39 54 150 
Chemica1s (25) % in the industry 
% in size category 10.00 9.87 
28.00 
11.23 
26.00 
13.40 
36.00 
20.53 
100.00 
13.89 
Non-ferrous metal basic 
industries (31) 
IAbsolute freq. 
% in the industry 
% in size category 
15 
13.89 
9.87 
55 
50.93 
14.71 
22 
20.37 
7.56 
16 
14.81 
6.08 
108 
100.00 
10.00 
IAbsolute tteq. 13 27 22 13 75 
Basic Machinety (32) % in the industry 
% in size category 
17.33 
8.55 
36.00 
7.22 
29.33 
7.56 
17.33 
4.94 
100.00 
6.94 
IAbsolute freq. O O O 1 1 
Office Machinety (33) % in the industry 
% in size category 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
100.00 
0.38 
100.00 
0.09 
IAbsolute freq. 3 14 15 23 55 
Electric materials (34) % in the industry % in size category 5.45 1.97 
25.45 
3.74 
27.27 
5.15 
41.82 
8.75 
100.00 
5.09 
I Absolute freq. 1 2 7 6 16 
Electronic (35) % in the industry 
% in size category 
6.25 
0.66 
12.50 
0.53 
43.75 
2.41 
37.50 
2.28 
100.00 
1.48 
I Absolute freq. 2 12 12 14 40 
Motor vehicles (36) % in the industry 
% in size category 
5.00 
1.32 
30.00 
3.21 
30.00 
4.12 
35.00 
5.32 
100.00 
3.70 
IAbsolute freq. O 3 1 2 6 
Ship building (37) % in the industry 
% in size category 
0.00 
0.00 
50.00 
0.80 
16.67 
0.34 
33.33 
0.76 
100.00 
0.56 
Absolute tteq. O 1 4 3 8 
Other motor vehicles (38) % in the industry 
% in size category 0.00 0.00 
12.50 
0.27 
50.00 
1.37 
37.50 
1.14 
100.00 
0.74 
Absolute tteq. 1 1 O 2 4 
Precision instruments (39) % in the industry 
% in size category 
25.00 
0.66 
25.00 
0.66 
0.00 
0.00 
50.00 
0.76 
100.00 
0.37 
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Table 1 (cont)
 
Distribution of finns by industry and by size
 
Smal/ Medium 1 Medium 2 Large Total 
IAbsolute treq. 22 39 26 25 112 
Non-elaborated Food (41) %inthe industry 
% in size categOlY 
19.64 
14.47 
34.82 
10.43 
23.21 
8.93 
22.32 
9.51 
100.00 
10.37 
Elaborated food, tobacco 
and alcoholic drinks (42) 
IAbsolute _m:<I' 
%inthe industry 
% in size categol)' 
23 
28.75 
15.13 
22 
27.50 
5.88 
15 
18.75 
5.15 
2U 
25.00 
7.60 
80 
100.00 
7.41 
IAbsolutetreq. 11 19 24 22 76 
Basic Textile (43) % in the industry 
% in size categol)' 14.47 7.24 
25.00 
5.08 
31.58 
8.25 
28.95 
8.37 
100.00 
7.04 
Absolute treq. 2 9 7 3 21 
Leather (44) % in the industl)' 
% in size categol)' 9.52 1.32 
42.86 
2.41 
33.33 
2.41 
14.29 
1.14 
100.00 
1.94 
Absolute treq. 4 22 20 10 56 
Gannent (45) % in the industry 
% in size categol)' 7.14 2.63 
39.29 
5.88 
35.71 
6.87 
17.86 
3.80 
100.00 
5.19 
I Absolute treq. 6 18 13 6 43 
Wood and fumiture (46) % in the industl)' 
% in size categol)' 13.95 3.95 
41.86 
4.81 
30.23 
4.47 
13.95 
2.28 
100.00 
3.98 
Cellu10se transfonnation 
and paper edition (47) 
I Absolute treq. 
% in the industl)' 
% in size categol)' 
8 
12.12 
5.26 
25 
37.88 
6.68 
18 
27.27 
6.19 
15 
22.73 
5.70 
06 
100.00 
6.11 
IAbsolute treq. 9 13 16 4 42 
Plastic materials (48) % in the industl)' % in size categol)' 21.43 5.92 
30.95 
3.48 
38.10 
5.50 
9.52 
1.52 
100.00 
3.89 
AbsoJute treq. 4 8 6 5 23Other non-basic industries % in the industl)' 17.39 34.78 26.09 21.74 100.00(49) % in size categol)' 2.63 2.14 206 1.90 2.13 
I Absolute treq. 152 374 291 263 1080 
% in the industl)'Total 14.07 34.63 26.94 24.35 100.00% in size categol)' 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Note: 
Small means "Finn's average number of employees lower or equal than 25". 
Medium J means "Finn's average number of employees higher than 25 and lower or equal than 50" 
Medium 2 means "Firm's average number of employees higher than 50 and lower or equal than 75" 
Large means "Finn's average number of employees higher than 75". 
Percentages in parentheses. 
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Table2
 
Descriptive Statistics (Weighted avernges)
 
O/o 
1986 1987 
Year 
1988 1989 1990 1991 
Rates 01 growth 
RealOutput 8.28 7.83 7.82 0.06 0.04 
Employrnent 1.65 1.88 1.87 -0.82 -2.21 
Pennanent 0.41 0.32 -0.33 -1.41 -1.75 
Nonproduction 1.91 1.89 1.52 1.60 0.83 
Production -0.37 -0.51 -1.32 -3.10 -3.26 
Temporary 22.82 23.50 26.70 4.41 -6.04 
Wages 9.23 6.26 7.09 9.72 8.98 
Pennanent 9.11 6.45 7.64 9.26 8.82 
Nonproduction 10.23 7.33 8.89 8.38 8.74 
Production 7.99 5.57 6.04 9.05 7.91 
Temporary 14.84 8.98 8.13 13.06 6.63 
Investment rate 6.06 6.81 6.81 7.63 7.44 
Net investment rate 1.76 2.47 2.29 2.79 2.31 
Capital-labour ratio 6.75 6.64 6.56 6.47 6.59 6.78 
Labour shares (in pereentage of total employment) 
Pennanent 94.45 93.28 91.85 89.87 89.33 89.75 
Nonproduction 32.10 32.20 32.20 32.10 32.87 33.90 
Production 62.35 61.08 59.65 57.77 56.46 55.85 
Temporary 5.55 6.72 8.15 10.13 10.67 10.25 
--···-·------~-----------r-- ------------­
Table 3
 
Percentage oC Finns by Movements and Type oC Employment and by Year
 
Type of labour l\'bvement 1987 1988 
Year 
1989 1990 1991 
No Change 20.28 18.52 18.70 17.87 19.90 
Permanent Hiring 42.96 43.80 41.02 36.20 34.54 
Firing 36.76 37.68 40.28 45.93 45.56 
No Change 45.65 40.09 40.28 39.81 41.85 
Nonproduction Hiring 32.87 38.89 35.56 34.36 31.57 
Firing 21.48 21.02 24.16 25.93 26.58 
No Change 25.37 22.96 22.59 21.76 23.33 
Production Hiring 37.87 38.71 37.96 33.06 31.67 
Firing 36.76 38.33 39.45 45.18 45.00 
No Change 4.54 5.00 5.19 5.19 6.39 
Temporary Hiring 76.02 74.35 74.07 64.35 58.52 
Firing 19.44 20.65 20.74 30.46 35.09 
.. 
Table 4 
Percentage oC Ob;elVations by Movements and 
Type oC Employment and by 8ize (1987-1991) 
Type of labour l\'bvement 8ize 
Small Medium 1 Medium 2 Large Total 
No Change 44.34 23.90 12.30 5.02 19.06 
Permanent Hiring 29.21 40.54 42.75 41.22 39.70 
Firing 26.45 35.56 44.95 53.76 41.24 
No Change 68.82 55.45 34.30 13.99 41.54 
Nonproduction Hiring 18.81 26.74 41.17 47.56 34.63 
Firing 12.37 17.81 24.53 38.25 23.83 
No Change 47.24 29.73 15.88 8.14 23.20 
Production Hiring 29.60 35.94 38.83 36.04 35.85 
Firing 23.16 34.33 45.29 55.82 40.95 
No Change 8.95 6.04 4.06 3.34 5.26 
Temporary Hiring 71.45 71.39 70.10 64.87 69.46 
Firing 19.60 22.57 25.84 31.79 25.28 
Note: See Note to Table 1 
....._----------,-~-------..,,----------------------
Table 5
 
Probit model for tite pmbability of tite adjustments in
 
pennanent pmduction and nonproduction workers
 
YearVariable 1988 1989 1990 1991 
ln(L;,1_/J 0.2474 0.4507 0.4485 0.4349 
(0.0965) (0.0844) (0.0878) (0.0868) 
ln(Lit-/) 0.0441 0.1023 0.1998 0.3227 
(0.1082) (0.0886) (0.0917) (0.0941) 
ln(L;.t-l) 0.0964 0.0038 0.0773 0.0814 
(0.0826) (0.0749) (0.0752) (0.0746) 
L;. I}IL;, 1-2 0.5057 0.4667 0.1989 0.3729 
(0.6458) (0.6045) (0.6425) (0.6116) 
Medl 0.1481 0.0996 0.3372 -0.1697 
(0.2711) (0.2244) (0.2721) (0.2288) 
Med2 0.5477 0.1438 0.3607 -0.0367 
(0.3220) (0.2863) (0.3311) (0.2977) 
Large 07803 0.1782 0.2349 -0.5039 
(0.4233) (0.3926) (0.4319) (0.4132) 
Nn(L;,I./) 0.0737 -0.7217 0.2584 -0.5396 
(0.0787) (0.3029) (0.2891) (0.3361) 
Nn(L;,1-/) -0.0275 0.5668 0.3858 0.0838 
(0.0790) (0.2925) (0.3054) (0.2071) 
Nn(L;.I./) -0.0860 -0.1766 0.0402 -0.0521 
(0.0358) (0.0784) (0.0686) (0.0652) 
NnY;,1_2 0.0819 0.2156 -0.0629 0.1237 
(0.0628) (0.2762) (0.3146) (0.2823) 
I(Mit./>O) 0.3438 0.2315 0.3617 0.2646 
(0.4611) (0.1201) (0.1258) (0.1265) 
I(M;,1./>O) 5.5457 0.3713 0.2277 -0.0241 
(1142.1) (0.1406) (0.1425) (0.1433) 
I(M;,j<O) 0.4118 0.0873 0.2625 0.1090 
(0.4626) (0.1364) (0.1429) (0.1392) 
I(M;,j<O) 5.4641 0.3434 0.2738 0.0482 
(1140.1) (0.1364) (0.1436) (0.1395) 
Goodness-of-fit statistics 
% Right predictions 
Negative (D;/J;,I_¡=()) 87.50 86.92 85.05 86.50 
Positive (D;/J;,I_¡==l) 
Pseudo-R2 
60.11 
0.24 
60.00 
0.27 
64.69 
0.28 
61.63 
0.27 
~: LI, L2 and LJ denote the number of pennanent nonproduction, pennanent production and 
temporary employees respectively; Y denotes value added; In is the natural logaritlun and ~ is the 
difference operator. MedI, Med2 and Large are dummy variables denoting firm size (see Table 1). 
I(xEA) is the indicator function, which takes value 1 ifxEA is true, and zero otherwise. IndustIy 
dummies and a constant term were inc1uded in estimations. Standard errors in parentheses. 
¡!-~----
I ' 
I I 
I I 
I II I 
Table 6 
Percentage of finm by sigo of adjustment in difTerent labour inputs 
Year 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Change in pennanent nonproduction Equal sign 28.70 29.26 33.24 29.54 30.28 
vs. change in pennanent production Opposite sign 16.94 22.04 19.35 23.43 20.18 
Change in pennanent nonproduction Equal sign 30.09 35.46 32.96 31.94 28.33 
vs. change in temporary Opposite sign 22.68 23.15 24.72 26.20 27.41 
Change in pennanent production vs. Equal sign 39.54 38.33 37.78 33.15 33.15 
change in temporary Opposite sign 32.96 36.94 36.57 42.04 39.26 
~ ~~"~~~--'--------------¡-,-----------------------
abe 7
 
GMM: estimation of the system of Euler equations
 
for pennanent nonproduction and production WOrl<e1S
 
YII 
Pennanent Pennanent
 
Nonproduction Nonproduction
 YIIN 
Y22	 Y22 
Pennanent	 Pennanent 
Production	 Production 
(0.4420) 
Cross-adjustrnent Y13 Cross-adjustment 0.0032 
effects effects (0.0039) 
Yn Yn 0.0195 
(0.0121) 
ennanent ennanent 7 
Nonproduction Nonproduction (0.0014) 
Pennanent Pennanent 
-0.0006 
Production Production (0.0009) 
Joint effect 0.0163Joint effect (0.0075) 
Pennanent Pennanent
 
Nonproduction Nonproduction
 
Pennanent Pennanent (0.0736) 
Production Production ~?	 -0.2313 
(0.2197) 
test 
0.11 p-value 
te: Ime urnmIes mc u In a equatlOns. eteros tIclty-ro ust asymptotlC st . 
errors are reported in parentheses. J is the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a i with as many degrees of freedom as the 
number of overidentifying restrictions under the null of validity of the instruments; p­
value is the significance level aboye which the null hypothesis is rejected. 
